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Three years ago, on April 8, 1978, the European 
Council agreed in Copenhagen that a common strategy 
should be worked out for greater stability of ex­
change rates in the EEC. The Council also hoped 
that this would contribute towards reversing 
the divergent trends in economic and social develop­
ments in the Community since the first oil price 
shock. This might then turn out to be a stepping 
stone to closer economic and monetary union.
Two years experience with the European Monetary 
System may have disappointed some of these hopes: 
since the spring of 1979» when the EMS started after 
some delay, the economic problems at Community level 
and in most member states have become larger rather 
than smaller. Admittedly, the difficulties are not 
typical of the EEC and are not limited to it. The 
whole world economy is confronted with considerable 
additional burdens and uncertainties as a result of 
the oil price increases of 1 9 7 9 and 1980: worldwide 
boosts to inflation, the global risks of recession 
and the large external imbalances cast a dark shadow 
across international economic relations. They present 
great challenges both to our ability to adjust our 
economies and to the solidarity of the Western world.





























































































The extent of the problems involved becomes clear 
when it is borne in mind that in 1981 the OPEC 
countries will record current account surpluses of 
nearly the same order as last year, some 100 billion 
dollars according to IMF estimates. Consequently, 
countries that are highly dependent on oil imports 
must once again face up to large deficits in their 
current accounts, estimated at around 60 billion 
dollars for the OECD countries taken together, of which 
some 45 billion must be borne by EEC countries. Un­
fortunately, various factors belie the hope that 
oil-induced balance of payments disequilibria in 
the world will be reduced at a similarly rapid pace 
as in the period after 1973/74. This means that, for 
the foreseeable future, economic and monetary policy 
in our countries face the task of reducing 
the serious disequilibria in our current accounts 
and of seeing to it that the deficits are financed 
in the meantime.
I. The situation at the outset
As you know, the European Monetary System replaced 
the European exchange rate arrangement, the "snake", 
which was born in 1 9 7 3 after the breakdown of the 
international monetary system that was centred on 
the dollar. At that time the EEC countries tied 





























































































iy against the dollar. Within a few months some 
of the original participants left this first 
Community attempt at a system of fixed exchange 
rates, reducing it to a "mini-snake”, or as 
some would prefer to call it, a "DMark-zone".
The creation of the EMS was not merely a means 
to reincorporate other EEC currencies into the 
existing system. The pooling of reserves, the 
enlargement of credit facilities and other 
provisions of the new system, and the intention 
of the Heads of State and Government to see the 
system consolidated into a European Fund indicate 
that the project extends much beyond that.
As is well known, opinions differed for a long 
time on the means by which a monetary union 
should be achieved. For Germany's part, "economic" 
reasoning as opposed to reliance on "monetary" 
or exchange rate constraints has always had pre­
cedence. Under the "economic approach", economic^ 
fiscal and monetary policies pursued with the 
objective of achieving a large measure of conver­
gence in the economic development of the 
member states, were considered essential to the 
achievement of stable exchange rate relation­
ships, with a high degree of price stability in 





























































































Against that, the ideas and models submitted by 
others for the European Monetary System tended 
to emphasize a more "monetarist approach", v/hich 
in this particular content implies a firm commit­
ment to fixed exchange rates and to intervention 
in the exchange markets, supported by adequate 
credit facilities, as major instruments to achieve 
harmonization in other fields of economic policy, 
including particularly monetary policy.
The formula actually adopted comprises elements 
of both approaches. It can be found in the final 
paragraph of the Bremen communiqué on the European 
Monetary System, according to which the "system 
of closer monetary cooperation will only be success­
ful if participating countries pursue policies 
conducive to greater stability at home and abroad". 
Thus, the European Monetary System is the child 
of two parents, which may be taken as a good omen 
for its survival.
II. Experience with the European Monetary System
The existing global economic tensions and imbalances 
make the EMS an ambitious undertaking. The short 
period of two years is hardly sufficient for a 
final judgment on the contribution of the European 
Monetary System to monetcrv stability in Europe 






























































































At best, a preliminary judgment is possible.
Two things may be said, at the outset, however:
More than two years of the SMS have neither confirmed 
the fears of those who foresaw large-scale inter­
vention and recourse to credit facilities in an 
effort to defend the agreed margins of exchange 
rate fluctuations around bilateral central rates; 
nor have they revealed significant progress towards 
the greater convergence in economic performance 
and policies considered essential in the longer 
term if the Si 13 is to fulfill the expectations 
placed in it.
1. As regards external stability, i. e. exchange 
rate stability, a preliminary evaluation of 
the European lionetary System would on balance 
be positive. There were only the two limited 
exchange rate adjustments in the first year 
of the El 13 affecting the Deutsche Mark and 
the Danish krone, and then the more recent 
devaluation of the lira. These adjustments 
were performed smoothly without undue disturb­
ance to the markets. At most times, moreover, 
exchange rates were kept within the existing 
bands around the agreed bilateral central rates 
without too great difficulties and without tco 
great expense in terms of intervention, and 




























































































ities which are available. That this proved 
possible in circumstances that undoubtedly 
would have prompted wider fluctuations of 
rates against each other in response to market 
forces without the existence of the EMS is no 
mean achievement. In many ways this experi­
ence was different from what some people 
expected, and in fact feared, when the EMS 
was negotiated and decided upon. Many observers 
saw the risk of large-scale intervention in 
support of certain potentially weak currencies, 
or intervention designed to keep relatively 
strong currencies from breaking through the 
margins at the top. After years of strength, 
and continuing appreciation against other cur­
rencies, the DM was clearly seen as a currency 
that might constantly tend to push against 
the upper limit of the EMS band. Tying it 
firmly to other major currencies that were 
less prone to appreciate against third cur­
rencies, especially the U.S. dollar, was not 
universally regarded as advisable, since this 
carried with it the risk of serious strains 
as known from the early phase of the "snake" 
experiment. It was not obvious from the be­
ginning that the conflicts to which this 
might give rise could be resolved easily 
under the formula adopted for changes of




























































































central rates, which called for mutual 
agreement by all partners. So far no major 
problems have in fact arisen. Intervention 
was sizable at times, particularly in support 
of currencies such as the Belgian franc. And 
there was also substantial intervention 
involving the Dm, but not in order to prevent 
it from breaking "through the roof", but on 
the contrary to support it in a situation of 
weakness. The DI-I has also been used more 
widely than was perhaps initially envisaged 
(at least on the German side) for "intra­
marginal intervention", which is undertaken 
largely in order to smooth out rate move­
ments within the band, The prolonged weak­
ness of the DM to which I have referred, 
and the need to support it at times within 
the SLiS came at first as somewhat of a sur­
prise. But it helps to explain the relative 
absence cf tensions in the EH3 over its first 
two years of existence. There are a variety 
of factors that account for that weakness, 
some of them may be only temporary, others 
may turn out to be of somewhat longer duration.
Foremost among these factors is the firmness 
which the U.3. dollar has regained relative 




























































































to the move by the United States from the 
position of a deficit country through most of 
the seventies to a surplus country in its 
current payments, whereas most other indus­
trial countries have moved sharply into 
current deficit in the wake of the second 
oil crisis (the United Kingdom being the 
other notable exception). But it is also 
due to the high level of interest rates 
which has prevailed over many months now 
in the United States as part of the anti- 
inflationary stance of monetary policy 
pursued by the Federal Reserve System.
In these circumstances of a generally 
stronger dollar, the DM turned out to be 
among the weaker currencies; this became 
specially visible in its position at the 
lower end of the Egg margin during most of 
last year and lasting until mid-February 
of this year.
Just as tiie surplus position on current 
account favoured the dollar, the except­
ionally large current account deficit 
assumed by Germany - 28 billion DM, or 
16 billion dollars in 1980 - 'weighed 
heavily on the DM. And the high interest





























































































rates which exerted a strong pull on funds 
to be placed in dollar investments contrasted 
v/ith relatively low German interest rates 
throughout I960. But German interest rates 
were not only low compared with dollar rates, 
they were also low compared with those in 
other countries in Europe. Host of the 
countries in the El-iG continue to have much 
higher inflation rates than Germany, and it 
is not surprising that they also have cor­
respondingly higher interest rates. For 
some time now these countries (including 
Italy as a prime example) have been pursuing 
restrictive monetary policies not only in 
order to assure that their exchange rates 
remain safely within the Elio band, but for 
domestic reasons as well. So far these re­
strictive policies have not led to the greater 
stability of domestic prices which alone will 
promise more stable exchange rate relation­
ships in the longer run, but they have helped 
to maintain cohesion of the exchange rate 
pattern of the EMS in its initial phase.
The fact that the Dll's weakness has helped 
cohesion to be maintained within the EMS is, of 
course, not reason enough to view this weak­





























































































From our own German point of view this 
prolonged weakness of the DM, both globally 
and within the EMS, could only be viewed with 
considerable concern. And it is doubtful 
whether it should be viewed as positive 
from a European point of view. Just as the 
prolonged weakness of the U.3. dollar cannot 
be called a universal blessing, a weak DM 
in the EMS is not likely to be helpful 
when viewed in a longer-term perspective.
The international roles of the dollar and 
of the DM - especially in its European con­
text - are such that trade and payments of 
all countries will be adversely affected 
if the key currencies are subject to doubt 
and instability. I need only point to the 
existence of large multinational companies 
which will be strongly affected in their 
world-wide operations by the changing fate 
of the major trading and investment cur­
rencies. Faced with currency uncertainty they 
will try to safeguard their position, and 
this may in turn add to the disturbances 
to which currencies are subjected.
The weakness of the DM signalled a market 
judgment which was different from that of 
earlier years; it could not - so it turned 




























































































and of its own,because it reflected a 
change in the underlying position of the 
Dii.not in terms of the stability of 
domestic prices and costs relative to 
those in other countries, but in terms 
of the current account of the balance of 
payments and of some of the factors respon­
sible for its sharp turn into deficit 
(including factors that are related to our 
dependence on imported oil and to the 
sharply deteriorating "structural" elements 
in our foreign trade and invisible trans­
actions); and it mirrored a certain measure 
of scepticism concerning the ability to 
reverse the adverse trend within a reason­
able time.
The nominal depreciation of the DM vis-à-vis 
the dollar, some 10 per cent during 1330 
(and another 13 per cent up to mid-February 
1981)»was long considered both undesirable 
and unwarranted, mainly for three reasons:
- it was in clear contrast to the inflation 
differential in Germany's favour, both 
against the dollar, and - more important­
ly - against the average of our trading 
partners, and





























































































- it entailed the risk of inflationary 
impulses through higher import prices 
and the 'vicious' effects on domestic 
costs and prices and incomes; and
- the downward movement of the exchange 
rate v;as still thought likely to be re­
versed within a relatively short period 
of time once the 'recognition lag' of the 
underlying greater stability and strength 
of the Oil elapsed.
Against that the expectation of positive gains, 
especially on the export side, of a substan­
tial 'real' depreciation was given much less 
weight, dome improvement of the trade balance 
was at any rate thought likely as the cyc­
lical and 'locomotive' effects of more rapid 
demand growth in Germany than elsewhere dim­
inished, and the 'real' depreciation resulting 
from greater price stability - with nominal 
exchange rates assumed relatively unchanged - 
worked itself through to import and export 
volumes.
'.That this adds up to is that the German 
authorities did not opt. for an apparant 




























































































of payments predicament, because they 
simply did not see an easy way out; they 
still do not see an easy way out. Their 
actions show that they did not adopt any 
of the recommendations given to them, com­
prising devaluation of the DM within EM3, 
or temporary suspension of participation 
as a means to escape from an "exchange rate 
trap". Total ’benign neglect' of the newly 
emerged balance of payments constraint and 
concentration on the domestic economic con­
straints of high unemployment and slow growth 
was considered a real possibility by those 
who called for low interest rates while 
leaving the correction as well as the finan­
cing of the large current payments deficit 
to its own devices, or to good fortune.
Some proponents of such formulae argued 
chat the "stability bonus" of the DM could 
not be expected to bear fruit so long as 
more attractive investment opportunities 
were offered by other currencies bearing 
a relatively higher rate of interest, and 
possibly helped, at least momentarily, by 
insulation from major exchange risk under 
the rules of the EMS in the prevailing circum­
stances. Even though these views contained 





























































































be adopted as a guide to policy, for a 
number of reasons. One of these rests on 
the fact I have already alluded to, namely that 
the weakness of the DII within the EHS - 
though in good part the mirror image of 
the strength of the dollar - mainly re­
flected such factors as the exceptionally 
high German deficit on current account, 
the particularly low level of interest rates 
compared with other industrialised countries, 
and certain other non-economic factors,which 
called for policies that promised to deal 
effectively with the causes of the imbalance.
In such circumstances neither intervention 
to support the exchange rate at a particular 
level was likely to be an adequate response 
over any length of time; nor was it felt 
that the balance of payments constraints 
could be simply ignored, and the exchange 
rate be left entirely to the forces of the 
market, as some suggested. As it turned out, 
monetary policy had to be shifted eventually 
so as to narrow the existing wide interest 
rate gap somewhat and to restore a sounder 
basis for public confidence at home and 
abroad in the intentions and actions of 
polic3rmakers. In fact, the confidence factor 




























































































February 19, 1S31 by the central bank 
rnay merit as much weight as the actual 
interest rate effects, if not more.
As a result,the position of the DM 
against the dollar has been stabilized, 
and the DU has moved back to the upper end 
of the Elio band.
But it would be very premature to claim 
all
that/problems have been overcome; this is 
far from the truth. brith exchange rates 
relatively stable within the EM'S, the persist­
ence of wide inflation differentials raises 
the possibility of countries with relatively 
stable costs and prices such as Germany 
importing inflation from other more infla­
tionary partner countries with double-digit 
rates of inflation. During 19S0 when the 
DII tended to be weak generally against 
other currencies and depreciated measurably 
against the dollar as well as on a trade- 
weighted basis, this was a threat which 
was not typical of the EMS and to Germany's 
participation in that system. It posed a 
more generalized problem for monetary pol­
icy which had to try to keep external 
impulses from higher oil prices and other 
import prices due to the worsening of the




























































































1 6  -
terms of trade from spreading and thus 
fuelling domestic inflation. In this, 
monetary policy was reasonably success­
ful in 1980, though the inflation rate 
in fact rose somewhat faster towards the 
end of the year than at the start. As I 
have said, the risk of imported inflation 
through ’real* depreciation of the exchange 
rate was a problem extending beyond the EMS.
But it may still be instructive for a moment 
to look at certain bilateral exchange rate 
relationships within the EMS, especially the 
example of Germany as' compared with Italy, 
fhis example shows that even the room pro­
vided by the wider margins of fluctuation 
for the lira of - 6 per cent in the Elio 
(and taking into account the realignments 
that have been undertaken so far) has not 
been large enough to offset the existing 
gap in inflation rates between the two 
countries for any length of time. In the 
two years from the start of the EMS up to March 
20, 1981 (i. e. excluding the devaluation of the 
lira on March 12, 1981) the Deutsche Mark appre­
ciated by only 7.4 % against the lira; while in the 
years 19 7 9 ana 1980 taken together consumer 
prices in Italy rose four times faster than in 





























































































of the lira implied a further appreciation 
of the Deutsche Mark by only 2.2 up to the 
present date.
Recent experience with the devaluation of 
the lira proves that the system allows for 
necessary adjustments of central rates in 
the EM3 to be undertaken in good time. The 
mutual agreement required under the system 
in such cases can be attained provided 
there is clear evidence of the need for 
adjustment, as has been the case for the 
lira. It is understandably difficult to 
prepare changes in central rates a long 
time beforehand if they are not to cause 
speculation and instability. This makes it 
all the more important to hold constant 
consultations which signal the emergence of 
tensions at an early date. What may be less 
evident in some cases is the adequacy of 
measures in other fields to assure the 
lasting success of any exchange rate adjust­
ment. Countries will always be given the 
benefit of the doubt; but they in turn 
should be fully conscious of their respon­
sibility for the cohesion of the system 





























































































2. Before turning to the broader issues of 
closer economic convergence within the EMS 
as essential to its proper functioning 
in the future, let me briefly touch on 
one other area where experience over the 
first two years has not been quite as 
expected. This is in regard to the 
nooling of reserves. ECU holdings 
credited to the EEC central banks by 
the EFMC against 20 per cent of their 
gold and dollar reserves serve as the 
instrument for settling balances that 
accrue as a result of intervention in 
EI-I3 currencies. In less than two years 
the volume of ECU has more than doubled 
from ECU 23 billion to 49 billion; it 
is more than just a flaw in the system 
that the increase is almost exclusively 
due to the fact the the ECU created against 
gold have almost tripled in volume (from 
ECU 13 billion to 33.3 billion). Owing to 
the preliminary character of ECU creation 
in the initial phase of Elio, there is per­
haps less danger that an overly generous 
supply of reserves will induce EEC countries 
to neglect necessary adjustment measures 
than might otherwise be the case. But with 





























































































order the SIC is setting a bad example 
for controlled liquidity creation, 
especially with respect to demands by 
the developing countries for increases 
in international liquidity. Moreover, 
the possibility of a reversal of the 
upward movement of the gold price, with 
the attendant danger of considerable 
reserve losses for some countries, can­
not be dismissed entirely. At all events, 
the elements of instability inherent in 
the development of the price of gold 
should not be underestimated, and appro­
priate attention should be given to this 



























































































III. Problems of divergence in economic developments
Comparing the situation when the European 
Monetary System was launched early in 1979 
with that of today, it cannot be overlooked 
that economic harmonisation in the Community 
has suffered a relapse. The boost to inflation 
in the EEC caused by the rise in oil prices 
has had differing effects from country to 
country and hence has led to greater divergences 
again in economic developments.
In 1981 consumer prices in the EEC will 
probably rise on an average by 10 1/2 At 
the beginning of the year (March) the 
maximum price differential between two countries 
with the lowest and highest inflation rates in 
the EEC, namely Germany and Italy, was 
about 14 1/2 % . In 1979 and 1980 the 
gap between the inflation rates of the two 
countries was 10.7 % and 15.7 % , respective­
ly. It is obvious that, under a system of 
stable exchange rates, divergencies in 
price developments of such dimensions have 
an impact on the relative competitiveness 






























































































Germany's greater price stability has been 
clearly reflected in its trade with Italy 
(and even more so in its trade with France).
The growth rate of German exports to Italy, 
at 26 % in 1 9 7 9 and 20 % in 1980, was almost 
twice as high as the increase in our exports 
to the industrial countries of the West taken 
together (14 % and 11.5 % ) . As a result, Italy's 
share in our total exports rose from 7 % in 
1978 to 8.5 % in 1980: the share of our imports 
from Italy in total imports fell at the same 
time from 9-5 % to 8 % . This is only the 
example of our two countries as far as their 
foreign trade performance is concerned. How­
ever, divergencies within the EEC cover a much 
wider range. The current account balances of the 
EEC countries show great differences, ranging 
in 1981 from a surplus equivalent to 0.4 % of 
the gross national product in the United King­
dom to a deficit of some 6 % in Belgium.
Even more worrying are the figures anticipated 
for the net public sector borrowing requirements 
in the individual member countries of the EEC; 
in relation to the gross national product, they 






























































































These are only some major examples of the lack of 
convergence of economic performance in the 
EEC. I said a moment ago that it was probably 
largely due to the distinct weakness of .the 
Deutsche Mark last year and until the middle 
of February 1981 that the lack of convergence 
did not result in serious tensions in the EMS. 
Unless major progress is achieved in harmonising 
those factors in the individual economies that 
are of basic importance for exchange rates in 
the EMS, it is obvious that such tensions are 
likely to arise again once the position of 
the Deutsche Mark in relation to the dollar 
is stabilised or reversed. The monetary policy 
decisions adopted in Germany in‘mid-February 
were taken with a view to stabilising the DM/ 
dollar rate as part of a more broadly based 
effort to deal with the imbalance which 
confronts us. The more stable performance of 
our exchange rate against the dollar since 
then has been paralleled by a move of the 
DM back towards the upper range of the EMS 
band, a position which appears to be some­
what more in line with the underlying stabil­
ity of the DM compared with other EMS cur­
rencies, if measured in terms of price and 





























































































there is no law under which the DM would he 
assumed to take top position within the EMS 
band. We have in fact always felt that the 
position of the DM relative to other EMS 
currencies would be determined in consider­
able degree by its position vis-à-vis the 
dollar, owing to its special international 
role as an alternative for the investment of 
private and official liquidity. But so long 
as the underlying stability of the DM 
especially in terms of its cost and price 
performance us so much greater than of other 
EMS currencies, a relatively strong position 
within the EMS band would seem to be the 
rule, rather than the exception, last year's 
experience notwithstanding.
There is in fact much leeway to be made up 
in the direction of greater convergence of 
economic developments and economic policies 
in the widest sense. For countries with 
specially high rates of inflation it is 
imperative that they continue with their 
restrictive policies; there is full agreement 
on that score among member countries. Depending 
on the individual situation, every single 
member country must decide where to put the 





























































































little doubt, however, that budgetary deficits 
in the range of 10 % of the gross national 
product or more are in urgent need of 
correction. Experience shows that public 
sector deficits of whatever size will not 
buy more employment and growth, but that they 
will fuel inflation and hence undermine the 
foundations on which sound economic and 
financial policies can be built.
Other areas where there is need for more 
convergent attitudes relate to wage and in­
come determination as a major element in 
the trend of costs and prices in the various 
countries. It is increasingly realized that 
indexation,especially its more formalized 
varieties, has developed into a very power­
ful mechanism fuelling inflation. It may 
well be that in countries with hyper­
inflation, where money has lost its function 
as a standard of value entirely, indexation 
is inescapable and may indeed serve to 
restore a measure of control over the in­
flationary process, if properly applied. We 
have not reached the disastrous stage of 
hyper-inflation and all our currencies in the 
EMS continue to perform their various 
functions. In these circumstances indexation 





























































































perpetuate the inflationary process rather 
than control it. The monetary authorities 
have a special stake as their instruments 
of monetary control are blunted by indexation; 
but the public at large should also be made 
to realize that indexation constitutes an 
illusion rather than an effective assurance 
against the erosion of real income.
IV. The prospects of the European Monetary System 
with respect to European integration
Let me briefly turn to the prospects for 
European integration and the role of the EMS. 
The timetable originally envisaged by the 
European Council for the transition of the 
EMS to its final stage by March 1981 could 
not be adhered to. At present the legal 
basis, as well as the economic convergence 
necessary for a decision of such importance, 
are still lacking. At any rate, major 
political decisions will have to be taken 
for such a transition to become possible.
As is well known, the final system will 
entail changes from the rules that apply 
during the transitional phase in three major 
respects, namely






























































































- the unrestricted use of the ECU as a 
reserve asset and means of settlement, 
and
- the consolidation of the existing credit 
mechanisms in a single fund.
In our view the transition to the final stage 
constitutes a "qualitative jump" in the 
process of integration in the European 
Community because it implies the transfer 
of an important aspect of the sovereignty 
of member countries to a Community institution, 
namely the European Monetary Fund. Before 
this transfer can actually take place greater 
clarity must exist as to the factors and 
rules according to which decisions are to 
be made at Community level. Moreover, there 
must be greater assurance that exchange rate 
stability between the EEC currencies will be 
supported by a greater degree of convergence 
in economic developments and economic policy. 
Last but not least, the legal basis for 
transferring powers to the Community at na­
tional and Community level must be established. 
I believe we all agree that such far-reaching 






























































































Of course, the question can also be raised 
whether the transition to the final stage 
should be undertaken before all the member 
countries of the Community have fully assumed 
their rights and duties under the present 
system and have gathered experience with 
them. In concrete terms, this poses the 
question of the participation of the United 
Kingdom and Greece as well as the special 
conditions conceded to Italy. Let me make 
a few brief comments on these points.
In principle, the timing of a decision to take 
part in the existing EMS with full rights and 
obligations should be left to each individual 
country. This is especially true so long as 
the EMS has not taken on its final form.
There can be good reasons - and in this 
context I am thinking particularly of Greece, 
which must first be gradually integrated in­
to the common market - for refraining from 
accepting full membership in the EMS for a 
transitional period. But there may be good 
reasons for other countries as well to first 
aim for greater economic stability before 





























































































But the transition of the EMS to the 
institutional stage would be difficult 
to imagine if certain member countries, 
including possibly such large member states 
as the United Kingdom and Italy, were to 
stay outside or participated only to a 
limited degree. Some of the rules envisaged 
for the final stage, e. g. with respect to 
credits, would probably not leave much room 
for individual Community countries enjoying 
a special status. In this field, prolonged 
hesitation to participate could actually 
paralyse the will to pursue policies that are 





























































































V. The European Monetary System in its final 
form
Major questions connected with the final 
design of the European Monetary System 
still need to be clarified. Past discussions 
in the Monetary Committee and in the 
Committee of Central Bank Governors have 
however clearly illustrated the nature and 
complexity of the problems involved. These 
are, in particular, the following:
- The European Monetary Fund (EMD) and its 
main characteristics
With the transfer of ownership of monetary 
reserves and their administration, with 
the creation of ECUs and the granting of 
short-term credits to central banks, the 
EMF would be given functions typical of 
a central bank. For these reasons - and 
especially with respect to the possible 
transfer of powers in the future in the field 
of monetary and exchange rate policy - the 
EMF should have the character of a central 
bank. In view of the differences in the way 
responsibility in this field is regulated 
in each member state, the Funds will not be 





























































































interventions will not be transferred 
to the Fund. In so far as the medium-term 
support mechanism is transferred to the 
EMF, this can only mean the assumption 
of financing and administration by the 
Fund; decisions on granting medium-term 
credits and the conditions attached 
to them should remain the prerogative of 
the Council of Ministers.
Role of the ECU
The ECU will only have a chance of 
becoming a fully-fledged reserve asset 
and instrument for settling balances in 
the future if it can be made at least as 
attractive as other reserve assets, in 
particular the dollar, as regards its 
usability, interest rate and maintenance 
of value; only then will the EEC central 
banks probably be prepared to hold ECUs 
in their reserves. In order to be able 
to fulfil at any time a request by EEC 
central banks for conversion, the EMF 
must be given the right to freely use 
the reserves transferred to it and, as 
necessary, must even have the possibility 
of taking up credit. The most promising 





























































































national setup in all the Community 
countries. Instead, it will be important 
for the Fund to be assigned the task of 
"safeguarding the value of the currency" 
and for it to be given sufficient autonomy 
to fulfil this task. In addition, it would 
be committed to supporting the general 
stance of the Community's economic policy.
Parliamentary legislative procedures
Far-reaching institutional rules have to 
be made in connection with the creation 
of the EMF, such as regulating its 
relationship with the organs of the 
Community as well as with national 
governments and central banks. These 
questions must be decided on the political 
plane by national parliaments and at 
Community level.
Consolidation of the credit mechanisms
The Europern Council explicity mentions only 
the short and medium-term credit facilities.
For practical reasons and because inter­
vention policy will remain in the foreseeable 
future in the hands of the national central 





























































































doubt to harden its internal value; 
since it consists of a basket of member 
currencies, monetary stability in all 
member state will therefore decide the 
fate of the ECU in the final analysis.
Common exchange rate policy
A "pooling" of national exchange rate 
policies within the European Monetary 
System is just as unlikely for the 
foreseeable future as a common policy 
towards third currencies. Although this 
does not exclude close coordination of 
monetary policy vis-à-vis third countries, 
the Bundesbank is, on the basis of its 
experience, against rules for a dollar 
policy that could endanger its room 
for manoeuvre as regards a stability- 
oriented monetary policy. A joint dollar 
policy will only be possible when economic 
policies end economic developments are 
convergent to a greater degree, with the 
result that the national currencies within 
the EEC are considered to be practically of 
equal value in the judgement of third parties.
The institutional design of the EM3 in its 
final stage, as I have just outlined it, 





























































































the member states to renounce national 
sovereignty in favour of the Community. 
There is no sign of this being the case 
at present. Moreover, with the creation of 
the EMS an advance step was taken in the 
monetary field which must be supported by 
closer economic coordination and more 
effective harmonisation in economic 
developments. From a legal point of view, 
also in the opinion of our EEC partners, 
the EMS has reached a demarcation line 
which can only be crossed by amending the 
EEC treaty or by means of a corresponding 
international agreement.
Whether, in the course of its gradual 
extension, the EMS will become the 
forerunner of a European monetary union 
obviously does not depend on its technical 
design but on the policies it is to serve. 
If the Community succeeds in finding a 
satisfactory answer to the numerous 
questions that are sill open, then it 
would also make an effective contribution 
to a viable international monetary system.
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